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Charities' Changing Tort Immunity
In attempting to apply the judicial yardstick in measuring the position of
charitable institutions, as to their tort liability in our present day society, the courts
have cast a confusing pattern of decisions. When viewed on a nationwide scope
the scene is a wardrobe of conflict and odd sized immunities. Charities in some
states are fully cloaked in a mantle of immunity from tort liability, while similar
charities in their sister states are stripped of all privileged protective raiment.
Between these extreme views, shades of subtleties determine the dimensions of
liability. In all but a few jurisdictions the legislature has remained silent.
Cases on the subject are characterized by riotous dissent, paradoxes of principle, fictional assumption of fact and consequence, by reasons more varied than
results. These, it has been said, "are the earmarks of law in flux."',
Decisions of the past dozen years have perhaps established a modern trend
by removing the immunity. A very recent Kansas case has been typical of this
trend. 2 It affected a sweeping alteration of previous policy in removing the immunity and placing charities on equal footing with all other corporations and
individuals in society. This court follows along with other total liability states
by requiring one to be just before being generous.
The vast majority of cases, it should be pointed out, involve property held
by a charitable corporation, since incorporation has practically replaced the technical trust as the legal mode of constituting permanent charities.8 Hospitals are the
most frequently attacked by claimants, although educational institutions, churches,
and poor homes are similarly situated with respect to the immunity. In trust
situations, where property is turned over to individual trustees or trust companies
for charitable purposes, the duty of the trustee is merely to invest the trust funds
and apply the income for charitable purposes. In such cases the question of tort
liability seldom arises. When, however, property is turned over to a charitable
corporation, as an outright gift, no technical trust is created and the corporation's
duty is to follow the charitable purposes of its charter.4 While there is a real
difference between a trustee's legal status and that of a corporation, " . . . it is not

believed that there should be any distinction between the two situations as to tort
liability."'
The courts in determining the charities' position as to liability are confronted
by a sharp contrast of values. Strict immunity often means that the individual
must go uncompensated for an injury received through no fault of his own; while
strict liability may mean that the charity must forego its future good works by
1 Mr. Justice Rutledge, in President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes,
130 F. 2d 810, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
2 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954).
8 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra,p. 815.
43 ScoTT, TRusTs § 402 (1939).
52A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 401 (1949).

virtue of depletion of its funds through claims founded upon its negligence. This
involves not only the protection of charity for the sake of charity but also safeguarding those other needy individuals destined to be deprived of future charitable
benefits. In short, what must be weighed is the effect of liability upon society, as
well as the effect of immunity upon the injured individual. Forming the background of this conflict is the rather clear and decided public policy of encouraging
charitable activities. Of course, while not always mentioned, the availability of
insurance is a modern factor tending toward liability.
The rule of immunity in this country had a very unusual beginning. The
first American cases founded their legal justification upon the dictum of Lord
Cottenham taken from the English cases of Feoffees of Heriots Hospital v. Ross6
and Duncan v. Findlater7 which had been followed in the English Case of Holliday
v. St. Leonard." The substance of this dictum was overruled by the House of
Lords when it next considered the question.' There has never been any immunity
in England since. On the contrary, it has been said, that diligent search revealed
no immunity anywhere else in the world except the United States.10 Although
overruled in 1866 by the English courts, this repudiated dictum was resurrected
and introduced in America by McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital," and
Perry v. House of Refuge.'2 The Perry case quoted this dicta as follows,
There is a trust, and there are persons intended to manage it for the benefit

of those who are to be the objects of the charity. To give damages out of a
trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the
fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose.
Mr. Justice Rutledge, commenting on this dictum, observes that Lord Cottenham regarded the exemption of these funds as only an application of the well settled
law of trusts.3" The English cases pointed to the fact that damages were to be
paid from the pocket of the wrongdoer and that he should not be indemnified
from the trust fund for his wrongdoing. However, the doctrine of respondeat
superior compelled the trustee to respond for the negligent acts of his servants
even though he himself had not participated in the wrong. Since it has become
more common for the charity to incorporate, the trustee's liability disappears, for
there is no trustee to be liable. The different position of officers and directors
shuts off recourse to their assets and strips the victim of all claims except against
the negligent actor, although the dicta upon which the immunity was based had
pointed the plaintiff to another source of recovery, i.e. the trustee.
Since the first cases, modifications and exceptions were abundant. Some of
the courts having progressively run the gamut from complete immunity through
6

12 Clark and Fen. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).

76 Clark and Fen. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (1839).
8 11 C.B.N.S. 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).

9 Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 H.L. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866).
10 25 A.L.R. 2d 29, 43 (1952).
11 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876).
1263 Md. 20, 52 Am. Rep. 495 (1885).

-1 President and Directorsof Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra.

Four main theories are applied to support
to a position of complete liability.'
the immunity granted to charitable corporations. One of these is the "trust fund
theory" based upon Lord Cottenham's dictum which would not permit a diversion
of the corporate fund held absolutely for charitable purposes. Another theory
granted a qualified immunity when the injury was to a beneficiary, if the charity
had used due care 'in the selection of its agents. The basis of this theory is the
somewhat novel idea that the beneficiary waives his right to recover damages for
torts inflicted by the charity when he accepts its benefits." A third theory is based
upon the non-applicability of the well-settled agency principle of respondeat
superior. It is said that since the charity receives no benefits from its servants, the
ordinary relationship of principal and agent does not arise. 16 This theory is
somewhat difficult to understand since the doctrine of respondeat superior was
founded upon the maxim que facit per alium facit per se. The fourth theory,
known as "the public policy theory", although given a separate distinction, seems to
be the foundation of the other three theories.'" This appears to be the more rational
of all the immunity views since it meets squarely the social problems involved
rather than stretching pre-existing legal concepts to suit the case.
Indeed, it is the weakness of the legal arguments supporting immunity, that
has permitted courts to refute this privilege and place the charities again within
the ordinary operation of the rules of tort liability. It remains without a doubt,
however, even in these courts, that charities should be encouraged and favored as
a fundamental principal of our social philosophy. To deny this is to either advocate a welfare state, wherein the government is solely charged with alleviation of
suffering and ignorance, or else remain dispassionately passive to the plights from
which, by nature, none of us are immune. No serious discussion in this country
has advocated such a philosophy of abandonment nor is it conceived that a Leviathan of Welfare would be welcome. This is certainly the feeling expressed in a
pointed Kentucky court opinion:
We are not convinced that the modern trend is away from the well-reasoned
and long established rule that charitable institutions are not liable for
,torts. As we gather the reasoning in the opinions from those jurisdictions
that have abandoned this well-rooted and salutory policy, it is based upon
the theory that private charity has been displaced by a paternalistic government, if not a welfare state, which furnishes free charitable services to the
indigent. However, there is still a school of thought in America which does
not believe that private charity is a thing of the past and that all burdens
of a suffering
humanity should be placed in the lap of government, state
and federal.' 8

The public policy toward tort immunity for charities then, is a matter of
degree. The same social policy, when reflected by a court concerned with the injured individual's rights, would stop short of immunity while other courts, conreferring to New York State.
25Bruce v. Y. M. C. A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 P. 798 (1929).
16 Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A 2d 328 (1951).
17 Coughman v. Columbia Y. M. C. A., 212 S. Car. 337, 47 S.E. 2d 788 (1948).
18 Porrest v. Red Cross Hospital, 265 S.W. 2d 80, 82 (Ky., 1953).
1425 A.L.R. 2d 29, 170 (1952)

sidering the broad class of beneficiaries, would extend the immunity at least to
some classes of claimants. Difficult sociological and economic factors must necessarily be considered by courts having neither the leisure nor facilities for such a
study. In the absence of a legislative declaration, it should not be surprising to
find the cases decided either by forcing established legal principles onto the facts
of the case or by the courts predisposition toward a particular social stand.
Considering only the immediate parties to the conflict, we find the injured
person left without relief where the immunity is granted, and the charity burdened
by claims where the immunity is denied. Professor Scott suggests that, perhaps
the real reason for the immunity is the fear of ungrounded claims against the
hospitals.19
It is now widely felt that risk distribution or insurance might solve the
problem satisfactorily. The Georgetown case, noted:
The rule of immunity is out of step with the general trend of legislative
and judicial policy in distributing losses incurred by individuals through
the operation of an enterprise among all who benefit by20it rather than in
leaving them wholly to be borne by those who sustain them.

If the court adopts a rule of immunity the injured parties are left without
relief. An attempt to remedy such a result in terms of insurance would practically
require universal coverage. It can be expected that everyone at some time or
another would be subjecting themselves, perhaps unknowingly, to the risk of injury
by such an immune group. When liability is imposed upon the charity, it is left
with a burden only partially minimized by its ability to secure insurance. With
many charitable activities this would reduce the loss to a negligible amount.
However, in other cases, particularly hospitals and such national emergency groups
as the American Red Cross, the cost of insurance, when available, remains a sizeable burden. As said in the Georgetown case:
What is at stake, so far as the charity is concerned, is the cost of reasonable
protection, the amount of the insurance premium as an 2added burden on its
finances, not awarding over in damages of its entire assets. 1

A recent Kentucky court expressed itself as follows:
If immunity from tort be abolished from charitable institutions, larger subscriptions and donations must be obtained to meet heavy premiums on
liability insurance, and the present enormous operating expenses of such
institutions will undoubtedly mount to dizzy heights. They are already
so high that paying patients in moderate
22 circumstances can hardly afford

hospitalization of even moderate duration.

Again, a hospital publication, in discussing the recent trend toward liability,
mentioned that some hospitals in Kansas, following the decision removing immunity, were notified that their insurance premiums would be raised as much as
23
300 per cent.

19 3 Sco'rr, note 4 supra at p. 2150.
20
Note 13 supra, p. 827.
21 Id., p. 824.
22 Note 18 supra, p. 82.
23 Note 2 supra; Health Legislation, Hospital Progress, June, 1954, p. 70.

Both hardships considered, it would seem more simple and certain to approach
the problem from the point of liability as the rule, and attempt to adjust the
burden upon the institutions wherever needed. A complete evaluation of the
experience figures of the various types of charities is needed. Aid is long overdue
in effectuating our policy of encouragement by some means short of immunity and
the consequent shift of responsibility to the injured party. Legislatures, it is believed, must inform themselves of the irregular and illogical holdings leaving our
social policy wanting of just fulfillment. Can we not picture the faltering stride
of willing workers to the scene of suffering, knowing full well of the need and
yet conscious of their own peril, seemingly small as it may be.
A legislative study is needed before the decisions of today give way to the
decisions of tomorrow based upon the decisions of yesterday.

Status of Immunity Doctrine in the States
I

No CASES ON POINT:

II

COMPLETE IMMUNITY:

N.Mex., S.Dak.
Ark., Colo., Ill., Ky., Mass., Md., Mo., Nev., Ore., Pa., S.Car., Tenn.,
2
Tex., W.Va., Wis., Wy. '
24Ark., Fordyce v. Womens Christian Nat. Asso., 70 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155 (1906)
(Ark. Stat. § 66-517 provides direct cause of action against the insurer.); Colo., St. Mary's
Academy v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925) (No bar to tort action that defendant is charity but trust funds immune from execution of judgment); see also 240 P. 2d 917;
Ill., Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 55, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950) (non trust funds may be recovered
against.); Ky., Porrest v. Red Cross Hospital, (Ky., 1954) 265 S.W.2d 80.; Mass., Roosen v.
Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N.E. 392 (1920); Md., Loeffer v. Sheppard
& E. P. Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 Ad. 301 (1917) (Statute prevents insurer from
asserting immunity) Md. Laws of 1947, c. 900 p. 2161; Mo., Dille v. St. Lakes Hospital,
355 Mo. 436, 196 S.W. 2d 615 (1946); Nev., Bruce v. Y.M.C.A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac.

798 (based on implied waiver, but indicated charities in themselves are not immune.); Ore.,
Gregory v. Salem General Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P. 2d 837, (1944) (based on
trust funds and public policy theories.); Pa. Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 2d 404, 84 A. 2d
328 (1951) (no recovery allowed against non-trust assets, the claim of a joint tortfeasor is
also defeated but immunity does not extend to purposes foreign to charity; includes breach
of duty.); S. Car., Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 212 S. C. 337, 47 S.E. 2d 788; Tenn.,
McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S.W. 2d 917 (No bar to action that
defendant is charity but execution may issue against only non-trust assets.); Tex., Felan v.
Lucey, 259 S.W. 2d 302 (1953) (hospital liable to its servants for corporate negligence;
liable if furnishing faulty equipment to treat patients.); W. Va., Roberts v. Ohio Valley
General Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925) (hospital held liable because of its
failure to allege due care in selecting employees.); Wis., Schau v. Morgan, 241 WIS. 334,
6 N.W. 2d 212 (1942) (Exemption from common law duties, liable under statutory enactments unless specifically exempted.); Wy., Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley, 24 Wy.
408, 160 Pac. 385 (1916) (plaintiff must allege and prove the hospital failed to use due
care in selection of nurses.)

III

No IMMUNITY:
Ariz., Calif., Del., Iowa, Kan., Minn., Miss., N.Dak., N.H., N.Y.,
2

Vt., Wash. 1
B. No decisions as to non paying beneficiaries, liability to all others.
26

Ala., Conn., Fla., Ga., Okla., Ut.

IV

PARTIAL IMMUNITY: As TO BENEFICIARIES, LIABILITY TO STRANGERS.
D.C., Idaho, Ind., La., Me., Mich., Mont., Nev., N.Car., N.J., Ohio,

R.L, Va. 27

WILLIAM T. DUCKWORTH
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25Ariz., Ray v. Tuscon Medical Center, 230 P. 2d 220 (Ariz. 1951) (overruled
previous immunity.); Calif., Maloy v. Fong, 37 Calif. 2d 356, 231 P. 2d 241 (1951);
Del., Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46 Del. 350, 83 A. 2d 753 (lower court decision.);
Iowa, Haynes v. Presbyterian Asso. 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W. 2d 151, (1950) (overruled
previous immunity.); Kan., Noel v. Menninger, Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934
(1954); Minn., Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakoniessenverein, 144 Min. 392, 175 N.W.
699 (1920); Miss., Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142
(on suggestion of error January 28, 1952, 56 So. 2d 709); N. Dak., Rickbel v. Grafton
Deaconess Hospital, 74 N. D. 525, 23 N.W. 2d 247 (1946) (court felt a statute would
be required to grant immunity.); N.H., Welch v. Frishie Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 337,
9 A. 2d 761 (1939) (no immunity in absence of legislative declaration.); N.Y., Dillon v.
Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N.Y. 176, 30 N.E.2d 373 (1940) (immune for negligence
of doctors, internes, and nurses in their general employ.); Vt., Foster v. Roman Catholic
Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230; Wash., Pierce v. Yakima Valley Hospital, 43 Wash. 2d
162, 260 P. 2d 765.
26 Ala., Alabama Baptist Hospital Board v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443 (1932);
Conn., Cohen v. General Hospital Society, 113 Conn. 188, 154 At. 435 (1931); Fla.,
Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940) (indications of
absolute liability.); Ga., Burgess v. James, 73 Ga. 857, 38 S.E. 2d 637 (1946) (no decision
by highest court regarding liability to strangers.); Okla., Gable v. Salvation Army, 186
Okla. 687, 100 P. 2d 244 (1940) (strongly indicates liability to non paying beneficiaries.);
Ut., Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Asso., 94 Utah 460, 78 P. 2d 645
(1939).
21 D.C., President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810
(1942), White v. Providence Hospital, (D.C. Dist. Col. 1943) 80 F. Supp. 76 (1943)
(held hospital immune when a patient was injured.); Idaho, Wilcov v. Idaho Falls Latter Day
Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P. 2d 849; Ind., Old Folks and Orphan Childrens Home v.
Roberts, 83 Ind. App. 546, 149 N.E.188(1925); La., Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity, 11 La.
App. 423, 123 So. 446 (1929) (Supreme Court case approving immunity.); Me., Jensen v.
Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 At. 898 (1910) (held immunity against
paying beneficiaries-no other cases.); Mich., Winslow v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Nat.
Home, 328 Mich. 488, 44 N.W. 2d 19 (1950); Mont., Borgess v. Oregon Short Line Railroad, 73 Mont. 407, 236 Pac. 1069; Neb., Wright v. Salvation Army, 125 Neb. 216, 245
N.W. 549 (1933); N.C., Williams v. Union County Hospital Asso., 234 N.C. 536,
67 S.E. 2d 662 (1951); N.J., Boeckel v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 108 N.J.L. 453, 158
Ad. 832 (1932); Ohio, Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E.2d 146 (1942); R.I.,
Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879), Statute grants
immunity regarding beneficiaries, (R.I. General Laws c. 116 § 95, 1938---changed previous judicial strict liability.); Va., Weston's Adminx. v. The Hospital of St. Vincent of
Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E. 785 (1921).

